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THE BRITISH MONOPOLIES ACT OF 1948: A CONTRAST
WITH AMERICAN POLICY AND PRACTICE
ON July 30, 1948, the British Parliament enacted Britain's first piece of
generic antitrust legislation-the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices
(Inquiry and Control) Act, 1948.1 Under the Act, which had Conservative
as well as Labor support, governmental power, working through an ad-
minstrative Commission under the direction of the Board of Trade, has
been specifically extended to strike against monopoly and restrictivism in
British industry.2 The disease is as familiar as the remedy-undesirable
business power is to be combatted with antitrust legislation. But the
present doctor is a labor government dedicated to implementation of a
monopolistic economy through nationalization, 3 and the patient is an
England gradually turning socialist. The Act may represent an attempt to
create competition in the midst of monopoly.4 More likely, at least in the
hands of a labor government, it is designed to serve as a procedural facade
from behind which further government controls can be extended over those
sectors of British industry as yet not nationalized.5 In any case, the tra-
1. 11 & 12 GEo. 6, 1948, c. 66 (hereafter referred to as Monopolies Act). The Act
was supported by the Conservative and Liberal Parties, as well as the Labour Party, and
was passed unanimously. 452 H.C. DEB. 2167 (5th ser. 1948). The somewhat clumsy
title is the result of a compromise between the original plan for simply "Monopolies Act,"
and the Conservative suggestion of "Restrictive Business Practices." 452 H.C. DEI.
2082-8, 2166; 454 id. 1079-80 (5th ser. 1948). See Plant, Monopolies and Restricfiive Prac-
tices, 10 LLoYDs BANK RE V. 1 (1948). The title suggested by the Conservatives was criti-
cized as an undesirable "Americanism" by Mir. Harold Wilson, President of the Board of
Trade and chief sponsor of the Act. 452 H.C. DE. 2036-7 (5th ser. 1948).
2. The preamble to the Act states that its purpose is "to make provision for inquiry
into the existence and effects of, and for dealing with mischiefs resulting from ... any
conditions of monopoly or restriction or other analogous conditions...." Monopolies
Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Guo. 6, c. 66.
3. See, e.g., LEws, MONOPOLY IN BRrIsH INDusTRY 1 (Fabian Research Series No.
91, 1945), denoting private monopoly as a problem to be handled during the interim period
of private enterprise before nationalization can be effected.
4. See Meier, A Critique of the New British Monopoly Act, 48 MAcH. L. REv. 3-29,
330 (1950) for the view that the Act is designed to restore competition to non-controlled
sectors of the industry. That some factions within the Labour Party have supported this
idea, see STOCKING & VATKINS, CARTELS OR Co NErrrxON? 363 (1948).
5. See pages 904-5 infra. Independent critics in the laissez-faire tradition have
complained the Act does too little against restrictivism and too much for the expansion
of government power. Offensive Against Monopoly, 154 EcoNom.sT 574 (1948); see
Cohen, The New British Law on Monopoly, 39 Am. Ecox. REV. 485, 487-9 (1949). But
the Conservative position varied little from that of the Labour Party, except for attacks
of a political nature. See, e.g., Speech of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, 449 H.C. Dun. 2039-
52 (5th ser. 1948). Their objections to the Act centered mainly around the exclusion of
government monopolies and labor unions from its scope. See note 39 infra. Further
Conservative proposals, if carried, would have weakened rather than strengthened the
Act. See, e.g., Speech of Lyttleton, 449 H.C. DEB. 2110-22 (5th ser. 1948) (that the
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ditional basis of antitrust legislation-preservation of the competitive
system 6-has given way before distrust of a free enterprise society and
dependence on a centrally controlled "planned economy." I
POLICY, OLD AND NEW
England has a long history of permitting the fact of monopoly to co-exist
with the theory of competition.8 Despite her background of theoretical
exaltation of the competitive system, Great Britain has never attempted to
maintain competition through legislation. 9 The Statute of Monopolies of
1624,10 and its reenactment in the final abrogation of the royal prerogative
in 1689, were aimed only at the arbitrary grants of legal monopoly franchises
by the Crown."" Since the time of those acts, throughout the disruptions
one-third criterion of monopoly "seems to have strayed into the Bill from fairyland or
from the pages of Walter de la Mare." The speaker was the Chairman of the Assocl-
ated Electrical Industries.) ; 452 id. 2107-11 (one-half proposed as an alternative to one-
third).
6. For a condensed checklist of the basic theoretical assumptions behind American
antitrust legislation, see OPPENHEIm, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRusT LAWS 91-9 (1948).
7. See JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE LABOR PARTY AND TIE TRADES UNION CONGEss
oN TRUSTS AND CARTELS, THE PUBLIC CONTROL OF MONOPOLY (1947), quoted hi!ra page
905; The Ground Roots of Monopoly, 155 ECONOMIST 619-20 (1948); ef. Lewis, Mo-
nopoly and the Law, An Economist's Reflection on the Crofter Case, 6 MOD. L. Rtv. 97,
111 (1943).
The Conservative Party has from time to time talked in terms of "competition." See
Speech of Anthony Eden in the N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1950, § 6, p. 7, col. 3; Tony Vt-
FORM COMMIrTrE, TooLs FOR THE NEXT JOB (1945), quoted in SoCCING & WATYINS,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 361. But the word must be read in its political context. Factu-
ally, it refers to an economy which, if it ever existed in Britain, was destroyed partially
through Conservative acquiescence in, and assistance to, industrial combination. See,
e.g., STOCKING & WATKINS, op. cit. sufra note 4, at 355-6; 156 EcoNoMIsT 95 (1949).
As used currently, the word refers to an absence of outright nationalization, rather than
the presence of either market or performance competition. For discussion of this point
as related to the Monopolies Act, see note 5 supra and pages 904-5 infra.
8. See generally LUCAS, INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONTROL OF CoM-
PETITION 17-19 (1937); MAXWELL-FYFE, MONOPOLy (Conservative Political Centre,
1948) ; STOCKING & WATKINS, CARTELS OR COMPETITION ? 342-72 (1948).
9. A*Trust and Combines Bill was moved in 1925, but failed to get through, See
Speech of Jones, 449 H.C. DE. 2092-9 (5th ser. 1948).
10. 21 JAC. 1, 1624, c. 3.
11. The public had become incensed at the unrestrained creation of monopolies by
Elizabeth and James I. When prior concessions made by Elizabeth to the anti-monop-
oly sentiment proved of little worth, the Statute of Monopolies was forced on the KIng.
See, e.g., LEvY, MONOPOLIES, CARTELS AND TRUSTS IN BRITISH INDUSTRY 17-23 (2d ed.
1927).
The Statute codified the distinction between grants of monopoly in already existent
businesses, and in new and useful inventions. The distinction had already been made
by the courts. Darcey v. Allein (the Case of Monopolies), 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.
1602) ; The Clothworkers of Ipswich, 78 Eng. Rep. 147 (IKB. 1615); see OrruxiemiM,
CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS 467 (1948). This was the historical origin of
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of the industrial revolution and subsequent rise of trade combinations and
integrated trusts, there has been no generic anti-monopoly legislation.
The absence of legislation did not mean the presence of competition. The
British trend towards industrial combination post-dated the parallel move-
ments in the United States and other nations.'2 But loosely-knit price-fixing
associations were in existence prior to 1880,13 and following the depression
of the 1890's, there was a strong swing towards industrial self-government,
"rationalization," and suppression of "ruinous competition." 14 The velocity
of the swing was increased by the exigencies of World War I; new com-
binations sprang up; old ones were strengthened and added to.15 The
slight tendency towards a decentralizing backswing in the 1920's was halted
abruptly by the slump of the 1930's.'G By the start of World War II, there
patent law. See SECOND INTERm REPORT OF THE DEPA EmENTAL Co.nm oN: PAT-
ENTS AND DESIGNS ACT 3 (Cmm. No. 6789, 1946) ; HANDLEa, PATENTS AND FrM ENrm-
PRisE 11-18 (TNEC Monograph 31, 1941).
12. The first large closely-knit industrial combination was the Salt Union, which
became prominent in 1888, when pressure for antitrust legislation was already strong in
America. The London Times, on Sept. 15, 188, called it "the great Salt Trust." 3
CLAPHAm, Ax ECONOmIC HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN 215 (1938). The Eco-o~Msr
in its CoMMERciAL. HISTORY OF 1888, p. 3, called upon Parliament to watch vigilantly the
attempt to monopolize "what is really national property." See 3 CLAPHMiA op. cil. supra,
at 215-6 (1938); CALVERT, A HISTORY OF THE SALT UNION (1913); MAcRosn, THE
TRUST MOVEMENT iN BRITISH INDUSTRY 182-6 (1907).
In America, Standard Oil, for example, had been in operation since 1870. Sec
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 5 (1911). The days of
industrial piracy had started as soon as the Civil War had ended, and in many areas
prior to 1890, "feudal domains" had been established by "the swashbuckling captains of
industry." See HTn.Tox & TILL, ANrIRusT ix Acriox 5 (TNEC Monograph 16,
1940).
13. See PARms OF ComurrTEE oN TRUSTS (1919), quoted in 3 C HA~ma, op. cit.
supra note 12, at 302; MAcRosTy, op. cit. supra note 12, at 203 (Lever, founder of a cor-
poration which at one time manufactured 70 to 755 of the total British soap production,
quoted as saying in 1906 that there had been a "working arrangement in the trade for
the past thirty years").
14. Complaints about the effect of "ruinous competition" had been heard in Parlia-
ment as early as 1833, and had been reiterated from time to time, especially by a Parlia-
mentary Commission in 1886. Lzvy, op. cit. supra note 11, at 169. But, according to
the report of an Industrial Commission created in 1893 by the United States Congress
to study the general problem, the real British drive towards amalgamation did not occur
until the end of the 90's. REPoRT OF THE INDusTRAL CoMmissIoN v. XVIII, Industrial
Combinations in. Europe 14 (1901). For the story of the rise of industrial combination
prior to World War I, see generally CARTER, THE TEworEcy Tow.ADs INDUSTRIAL Co!X-
BiNATiON (1913) ; 3 CLAPHAm, op. cit. supra note 12, cc. 4-5; MAcROSTY, op. cit. juspra
note 12, at 24 et seq. See also REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMSSION, op. Cit. StprO,
at 14-74.
15. See, e.g., Hilton, A Study of Trade Organications and Combinotions in the United
Kingdom in RPORT OF Cou=rr ox TRUSTS 15,20 (Cam. No. 9236, 1919) ; RF.s, TnusTs
Ix BRITISH INDUSTRY (1922) passim; LEwis, op. cit. supra note 3, at 7.
16. See LEwis, op. cit. supra note 3, at 7-8; LucAs, op. cit. .mpro note 8, at c. 2.
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was partial monopolistic control in almost every sector of the economy, and
in some sectors the monopoly was practically complete.
17
Against this tide stood the miniscule and leaky dam of the common law.
In theory, contracts in restraint of trade were void,"8 and damages suffered
as a result of a conspiracy to restrain trade could be compensated through
action in tort."' In practice, however, these concepts had little effect ex-
cept to hinder temporarily the activities of labor unions.2" Actions in con-
tract were affected only if the restraint was "unreasonable" in the eyes of
the court-a very rare event, since private interests were felt to coincide
with the public interest. 21 The chances of winning in tort, moreover, be-
came extremely limited because of the doctrine that the restraint must
spring from malice rather than business motives.22 The inadequacy of these
17. See MAxwEL--FYPE, MONOPOLY 17-20, 54 (Conservative Political Centre, 1948);
YELVERTON & TF.RORGI, TECHNOLOGICAL STAGNATION IN GREAT BRITAIN (1948). For
studies of particular industries, see, e.g., CINEMATOGRAPH FILMS COUNCIL, TENDENCIES
TO MONOPOLY IN THE CINEMATOGRAPH FILM INDUSTRY (Board of Trade, 1944); RE-
PORT BY THE CoMMITTEE oN CEMENT COSTS (Ministry of Works, 1947); RRnr or Tun
COMmITTEE OF ENQUIRY, THE DISTRIBUTION OF BUILDING MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS
(Ministry of Works, 1948).
The extent of the trend towards monopolization is exemplified in the powerful Feder-
ation of British Industries, an English cousin to the National Association of Manufac-
turers, which has been accused of advocating "a complete cartelization of domestic in-
dustry and international trade." See STOCKING & WATKINS, CARTELS OR COMPEIrTION?
357-9 (1948), citing Federation pamphlets published in 1944. The Federation specifically
included in a 1935 list of fields for "cooperation in the commercial and economic sphere
through voluntary association" such items as the following: avoidance of "undue" com-
petition, price regulation, interchange of statistical and technical information, publicity
and propaganda, centralization and control of sales, and demarcation of sales territories.
BRADY, BUSINESS AS A SYSTEM OF PowEn 161-2 (1943). In 1925, eight years after its
birth, the Federation clainied affiliation with some 20,000 manufacturing firms with a
capital of nearly $30,000,000,000. Membership has increased since then. Id. at 165, For
a complete picture of the Federation in contrast to the American National Association
of Manufacturers, see id. at 153-220.
18. E.g., Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 E. & B. 47, 119 Eng. Rep. 781 (Ex. 1855) ; e.
North Western Salt Co. v. Electrolytic Alkali Co., [1914] A.C. 461 (agreement to reg-
ulate supply and maintain price level held enforceable).
19. Cf. Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, [1892] A.C. 25. See SALMOND, TORTS
§ 156 (8th ed. 1934) ; WINFIELD, TORTS § 128 (3d ed. 1946).
20. See Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495; Temperton v. Russell, [1893] 1 Q.B.
435; Friedman, The Harris Tweed Case and Freedomn of Trade, 6 MOD. L. REv. 1, 7
(1942).
21. "Their Lordships are not aware of any case in which a restraint, though rea-
sonable in the interests of the parties, has been held unenforceable because it involved
some injury to the public." Attorney-General of Australia v. Adelaide Steamship Co.,
[1913] A.C. 781, 795. See REPORT OF COMnmins ON RESTRAINT OF TRADE 5-6 (1931);
Lewis, Monopoly and the Law-An Economis's Reflections on the Crofter Case, 6 MoD.
L. REv. 97, 101 (1943).
22. See Sorrell v. Smith, [1925] A.C. 700, 712. The malice required was the "dls-
interested malice" described by Judge Cardozo in Nann v, Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 319,
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doctrines as a weapon against trade combinations is obvious, and was
recognized. 23 But no changes were made because none were desired; freedom
of contract was balanced against the evils of restrictivism in the scales of
British policy, and the former was found the heavier.
24
This attitude, plus deep concern over commercial well-being, led to a
general tendency of the government to aid combination rather than to
impede it. With the notable exception of the 1919 Committee on Trusts,2 5
parliamentary investigation and recommendation was principally con-
cerned with assistance to industrial self-government.3 Legislative help in
174 N.E. 690, 695 (1931). See Friedman, supra note 20, at 3. The usefulness of the
tort rationale was further limited by the requirement of a conspiracy, i.e., two or more
persons plotting together. It has been pointed out that this means that the joint action of
two unemployed persons can be considered a criminal conspiracy, whereas no action on
the part of one corporation, even though it controls the entire output of steel, can be
so considered. Friedman, supra note 20, at 3. This difficulty has been transferred into
America in the language of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946). But it has been circumvented by the legal concept that a cor-
poration can conspire with itself. See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S.
218 (1947) ; United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert.
dezied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
23. Lord Bowen, for example, stated around 1890 that "[i]f peaceable and honest
combinations of capital for purposes of trade competition are to be struck at, it must, I
think, be by legislation, for I do not see that they are under the ban of the common law."
Quoted in REPORr oF ComISI-TE ON REsTREAnrT o TRADE 6 (1931).
24. See, e.g., REPoRT oF Com TE oN REsTRMNT or TADE 23 (1931).
25. REPoRT oF Comnrrnn oN TausTs (C=u. No. 9236, 1919). The Committee
made a detailed study of the industrial practices of the time, and recommended establish-
ment of a Trade and Combinations Department in the Board of Trade. The publicity
attendant on their research resulted in the introduction of the Trade and Combines Bill
in 1925. See note 9 supra. The Committee's findings and recommendations are collected
and discussed in REES, TRusTs ix BamsH INDUsTRy (1922).
The Committee was concerned, however, not with the absence of competition, but
with the presence of abuses. Despite its possible advantages, competition as such was
felt to be wasteful, almost immoral, whereas the potential good in combination was
great. See HILToN, supra note 15, at 16; cf. page 905 infra. Proposals for legislation,
therefore, centered about the need for safeguards, rather than the desirability of forcing
competition on industry. See REEs, TRusTs ix BRITISH INDUSTRY 250-5, HLTON, op. cit.
supra note 15, at 28-30.
A concurring opinion by four Committee members, including Ernest Bevin and Syd-
ney Webb, emphasizes the lack of faith in traditional "competition." After criticizing
the Committee's majority report for not adequately expressing the gravity of the situa-
tion, the concurrence went on to say:
"We do not suggest that any action should be taken to prevent or obstruct combina-
tion or association in capitalist enterprise. Apart from the ex-perience that no such in-
terference can be made effective, we have to recognize that association and combination
in production and distribution are steps in the greater efficiency, the increased economy,
and the better organization of industry. We regard this evolution as both inevitable and
desirable." ADDENDUM TO REPORT OF THE ComI=I"E ox TRusTs (C.w. No. 9236, 1919),
reprinted as Appendix IV in LEvY, op. cit. supra note 11, at 345.
26. See, e.g., FiNAL REPORT OF THE ComrITEE ON INDUSTRY nD TRADE 297-311
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restraining "disruptive competition" commenced with the Licensing (Con-
solidation) Act of 1910,2 and was continued by successive governments in
the principal sectors of the economy-foodstuffs, mining and metals, fish-
ing, transportation, and textiles. 2 At no time was there any flare of either
popular or governmental resentment against the power of business com-
binations; British policy varied little, and what variance there was, was
between hands-off and active assistance, not between attempts at control
and absence of action.
The passage of the Monopolies Act indicates no sudden reversal of past
policy. The Act is not designed to cure anything but undesirable symptoms.
Both the doctor and the patient like the disease. 9 The purpose is to control,
not to 'destroy, industrial combination; to direct, not to emasculate, the
policies of restrictivism. Until nationalization is completed, and the entire
means of production are in the hands of the government, something must
be done with those sectors of industry which remain in the hands of private
enterprise."' The Monopolies Act is that something. Its target is not mo-
nop oly as such, for atomization of industry in the name of competition would
only impede the march towards nationalization. Rather, in the eyes of both
Conservatives and Laborites, the Act is to serve as a means of regulating
those practices of monopoly groups which interfere with the current pro-
gram of full production.3' Under it, monopolism will flourish as before, and
only the direction of its policy will be changed. Instead of talking freedom
of contract and free enterprise while fostering monopolism, the Labour
Government has combined theory and practice.
Thus passage of antitrust legislation by a Government committed to total
monopoly, in a nation long used to a restrictivist, cartelized economy, is not
the paradox it might seem. A prominent Conservative spokesman had
outlined, prior to any legislative action on the present Act, a plan remark-
ably similar to that finally enacted. His program, too, was designed not to
destroy industrial combination, but to direct its policies, principally by in-
formal publicity, but if necessary also by regulative measures-price-filng,
(CmD. No. 3282, 1929). "The keys to the new order are not competition, industrial ac-
quisitiveness, or self-seeking, but co-ordination, science, and service." Id. at 304.
27. 10 Euw. 7 and 1 Gao. 5, 1910, c. 24, restricting freedom of entry into the retail
liquor trade. See MAxwm.L-FYFE, MONOPOLY 30 (Conservative Political Centre, 1948).
Cf. N.Y. Arc. Bm. LAw § 17.
28. For a brief description of this development, with citation of leading legislation,
see MAxwm.L-FYFE MoNoPoLY 30-3 (Conservative Political Centre, 1948).
29. See Offensive Against Monopoly, 154 EcoNoMisT 574 (1948).
30. See note 3 supra; Speech of Fernyhough, 449 H.C. Dan. 2072-7 (5th ser. 1948).
31. This purpose was mentioned frequently in the House of Commons debates. See,
e.g., Speech of Wilson, 452 H.C. DEn. 2163-4 (Labour, President of Board of Trade);
Speech of Fletcher, 449 id. 2053-4 (Labour); Speech of Maxwell-Fyfe, 449 id. 2052
(Conservative) (5th ser. 1948). Cf. The Ground Roots of Monsopoly, 155 ECONOMIST
619 (1948).
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allocation of raw materials, and special legislation. And the Labour
position is even more explicit. Distrust of competition, and the limits of the
theory behind the Act have been dearly and officially stated:
"The Labour Movement . . . is convinced that competitive
private enterprise, without public intervention in one form or
another, inevitably produces an unhealthy economy and an in-
equitable distribution of economic and political power. In advo-
cating public supervision of monopoly, the Movement's object is
not the restoration of free competition, but the operation of pri-
vately-owned industries in what may be broadly defined as the
public interest. . . .This object rules ouL the most clear-cut form
of action against-trusts and cartels-the outright prohibition of all
monopolistic practices by law. For while such legislation might
restore free competition, this in itself cannot necessarily be equated
with the public interest." 11
THE SCOPE OF THE Acr
To implement this policy, the Labour Government, with Conservative
support, has drafted an act which in so far as possible talks in terms of
economic results rather than business methods. The Act divides the econ-
omy into three sectors: supply, processing, and exporting.34 In the field of
the export trade, it may be used to direct the policies of any person produc-
ing one-third of any type of goods exported from the United Kingdom "both
generally and to each market taken separately," and to supervise any ar-
rangements preventing or restricting competition in the export of one-third
32. MAxwEL-FYFE, MONOPOLY 49-53 (Conservative Political Centre, 1948). The
proposals admitted the need of entirely separate legislation to deal with any restrictive
labor practices. Id. at 49. Since Sir David himself--the chief Conservative spokesman
in the Parliamentary debates-proposed that the Monopolies Commission's pove bt ex-
tended to include investigation of the activities of the boards controlling nationalized in-
dustrieS, an amendment-to that effect is possible should control of the Government change
hands. See 452 H.C. DEB. 2090-2107 (5th ser. 1943). A shift in political control would
in other ways tend to lessen, rather than increase, the efficacy of the Act. Any anti-
monopoly policy on the part of the Conservative Party is apt to be weakened by the
presence of monopolists within its ranks. See, e.g., 449 H.C. DEB. 2052-9, 2110-., and
2123-4 (5th ser. 1948).
33. JonT Cossrrrz oF 'THE LARoUR PARTY AND THE TRADES UN ION CO:GRnSS
ON TRusTs AND CAnTELS, Tn PuBuc CONTROL OF MONOPOLY 1 (1947).
The practical limits of what cars be accomplished by a few men on a small budget
may abrogate success in performing even a limited policing function. No tea-man Com-
mission can be expected to take on the task of clearing up "the legacy of half a century
of restrictivism, ignored, condoned or actively encouraged by successive Governments of
every party complexion." 156 EcoNoMsIsT 95 (1949). Expenses are not expected to run
over 50,000 annually. See 450 H.C. Din. 563-6 (5th ser. 1943). Cf. the remarks
about the "big act little stick" policy in America in HAatILrou & Tnz, AzimnusT n;
AcTIoN 23-6 (TNEC Monograph 16, 1940).
34. Monopolies Act § 2.
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of any type of goods from the United Kingdom, or in the supply of the same
fraction to any particular foreign market. 35 And in the supply and process-
ing sectors, the Monopolies Commission may move against:
(1) Any one business organization, or two or more interrelated organi-
zations, which dominate one-third of any particular type of business in the
United Kingdom or any substantial part thereof.36
(2) Any two or more business organizations, not interrelated, which
dominate one-third of any particular type of business in the United Kingdom
or any substantial part thereof, and which, whether voluntarily or not, and
whether by agreement or not, so conduct their affairs as to "prevent or
restrict" competition in that business.n
(3) Any arrangements as a result of which something is not made or not
done in the United Kingdom or any substantial part thereof.88
The words used to formulate this general scope are broad, chosen to en-
able the Commission to act freely. 9 But general words can generate prob-
35. Monopolies Act § 5. The specific application of the Act to the export trade
springs from a fear of the effect of domestic monopoly on Britain's foreign trade posi-
tion. See Speech of Wilson, 449 H.C. DEB. 2021 (5th ser. 1948); cf. United States v.
United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 453-4 (1920); Webb Export Trade Act, 40
STAT. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. J§ 61-5 (1946). Moreover, at least one purpose of the Act
is to enable Britain to fulfill her obligations under the International Trade Organization
agreement. See Speech of Wilson, 449 I.C. DEB. 2034-5 (5th ser. 1948) ; Plant, .supra
note 1, at 4-6.
36. Monopolies Act §§3(1)a, 4(1)a. The Conservatives moved an amendment to
change one-third to read one-half. The argument was that the clause was too broad,
since, coupled with the phrase "or any substantial part thereof," it could be interpreted
to mean, for example, that there could be three monopolies in Rutlandshire. The LI-
bour speaker opposed the amendment, calling the clause as written comparable to Amer-
ican practice. 452 -. C. DEB. 2107-S (5th ser. 1948); cf. United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (thirty-three per cent control "cer-
tainly" not a monopoly). The amendment was defeated. 452 H.C. Dan. 2110 (5th ser.
1948).
37. Monopolies Act §§3(2), 4(2). The phraseology is designed to cover situations
where there is no actual arrangement between the persons or firms concerned. This has been
said to hit price leadership specifically. Speech of Wilson, 449 H.C. DEB. 2033 (5th ser.
1948) ; cf. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). The Amer-
ican laws have been interpreted to come close to the same position. E.g., FTC v. Ce-
ment Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) ; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781 (1946). See Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43
ILL. L. REy. 745, 778-85 (1949) ; Comment, Price Systeins and Competition: The Basing-
Point Issites, 58 YALE L.J. 426, 448, n.94 (1949).
38. Monopolies Act §§ 3(1) b, 4(1) b. The omission of the one-third criterion in this
connection further emphasizes the intent to strike down production restrictions and
other forms of "private unentreprise." See note 31 supra.
39. Labor practices generally are excluded from the scope of the Act. Monopolies
Act §§ 3-5. The exclusion was put on the grounds that labor is not the same thing as
a commodity, and that hence any restrictive practices in the field of labor must be dealt
with by separate legislation. Speech of Wilson, 449 H.C. DEn. 2038-9; speech of Morri-
son, 449 id. 2127 (5th ser. 1948) ; cf. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1941) (Clay-
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lems in specific cases. The word "goods" is used frequently, because some
word had to be used to refer to the things that a business produces. It
specifically includes buildings and structures, ships and aircraft." Beyond
that, the Board of Trade and the Monopolies Commission can and must
adjust their definitions to the conditions of the industry concerned. 41 Ques-
tions as to what competes with what, or whether a certain metal in one state
of processing is the same type of goods as that metal in another phase of
production, will arise to plague the British Commission as they have arisen
to plague the American courts.42 The "one-third" criterion is therefore less
definite than it sounds: in the determination of its application, the problem
of one-third of what, in how substantial a part of the United Kingdom, is left
open for application of "such criterion . . .or such combination of criteria
as may appear . . . to be most suitable in all the circumstances." 11
And there will be further problems with words. The Act forbids "agree-
ments or arrangements" to be used to prevent new or improved products
from reaching the market.44 Here the Commission will be forced to decide
whether parallel action by competitors, without any evidence of actual
oral or written consolidation of policies, sufficiently indicates the e.xstence of
an "arrangement." 45 It faces a problem which American courts have not
squarely dealt with,4i for the results to be looked for are completely negative
-the absence of supply, or the non-production of something by British in-
dustry, rather than mere curtailment of production. In the last analysis, the
problems raised by the wording of the Act will be resolved by emphasis on
the economic facts unearthed by investigation, as they bear upon the specific
ton Act). Conservative speakers generally lamented the omission. E.g., 449 H.C. Dam.
2099-2102; 452 id. 2143-4 (5th ser. 1948) ; cf. MAxxvwLL-F'F, MfO.;OPOLY 49-50 (1948).
The activities of public monopolies are also outside the scope of the Monopolies
Commission's investigative powers. Monopolies Act §2(1). This exclusion was at-
tacked by the Opposition, and an amendment was proposed, designed to permit purely
factual reports concerning nationalized industries, etc. 452 H.C. Dan. 2090-2103 (5th
ser. 1948). The amendment was defeated. 452 id. 2104.
Both exceptions have received independent criticism. See 154 EcoiolsT 536; 154
id. 574; 154 id. 705; 155 id. 619 (1948).
40. Monopolies Act §20(1). The same section specifically defines production to
include the "getting" of minerals and other substances, and the "taking" of animals and
fish. "Supply" is made to include supply by means of lease or hire, and the construc-
tion of buildings for another. Ibid.
41. Monopolies Act § 20(4).
42. Cf., e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424-5 (2d
Cir. 1945).
43. Monopolies Act § 20(3).
44. Monopolies Act §§3(2), 4(2). See note 37 sup'ra.
45. Cf., e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) ; American Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1948).
46. See, however, Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945), especially the
dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas, id. at 380-4; Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern
Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
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action the Board of Trade may desire to force the industry concerned to
take. Thus parallel action by competitors will probably amount to an
"arrangement" where the economic result, as determined by the Commission,
is.one which is in conflict with national policy. This is particularly likely
where there is any stifling of innovation by the leaders of an industry-a
practice most explicitly proscribed. 47
The method of interpretation thus called for is completely ad treC.
4
9 It
depends on prior knowledge of the specific governmental policy to be ef-
fected. This is demonstrated most clearly in the problem raised by reference
to behavior that "prevents or restricts competition."" The phrase cannot
be taken literally as indicative of legislative intent, for restraints on com-
petition, as such, are not a target of the Act.50 The power to tamper with
prices has no relevance in England, because the government retains the
power to fix prices." But, if exercised, the power to exclude competitors
-a second familiar indicium of restriction of competition "-tends to lead
to "private unentreprise,""l lower production, supply limitations, etc., all
antithetical to the primary program of increasing the national capacity to
produce and adding to the total production. 4 This emphasis on maxi-
mizing production is the keystone of the economic arch the Act seeks to erect,
through the use of phrases which hark back to free enterprise concepts
theoretically repudiated by British policy. Without desiring competition
itself, the Government wants to satisfy the national need for one result of
competition-business drive for better products and higher output.
It is this theme also that lies behind the Act's unique contribution to
antitrust legislation draftsmanship-the concept of "public interest." 66
If the Commission's investigation discovers practices coming within the
ambit of the Act, it may or may not recommend their proscription, de-
47. See notes 31 and 38 supra.
48. The vagueness of the Act was criticized at the Second Reading in the House
of Commons; so ad hoc an arrangement was said to place too great powers in the hands
of the President of the Board of Trade. Speech of Morris, 449 H.C. DEn. 2062-3 (5th
ser. 1948). The necessity for flexible criteria in any antitrust legislation was pointed
out by Mr. Herbert Morrison. 449 id. 2132-3.
49. Monopolies Act §§3(2), 4(2), 5(2) (3).
50. See page 905 supra; JOINT Co MaIrT OF THE LABOUR PARTY AND THIE TuADus
UNIoN CONGRESS ON TRUSTS AND CARTELS, THE PUBLIC CONTROL or MoNoPoLY 1 (1947).
This document was released to the YALE LAW JOURNAL by the Research Department of
the British Labour Party.
51. Under Prices of Goods Act, 2 & 3 GEo. 6, 1939, c. 118. Cf. United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273
U.S. 392 (1927).
52. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
53. The term is taken from The Ground Roots of Monopoly, 155 EcoNo xsT 619
(1948).
54. See EcoNomic SuRvEY FOR 1949 (Cm. No. 7469, 1949), discussed in Warren,
The British White Paper: Economic Survey for 1949, 64 Po,. Sci. Q. 161 (1949).
55. Monopolies Act § 6.
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pending on the demands of the "public interest." There exists the possi-
bility of a "good monopoly," or of a practice, restrictive on its face, which
appears more satisfactory than any feasible alternative41 An industrial
combination which encourages productivity is outside the intended scope
of enforcement measures, whereas one a prey to "private unentreprise"
is a priority target. But the same methods of control may characterize each
combination. The "public interest" concept is formulated to differentiate
between them, and is broadly defined as including the overall economic
position of the United Kingdom." More specifically, but not exclusively,
the Commission is to consider whether the practices of the industry achieve:
(1) efficiency and economy of the means of production, treatment and dis-
tribution of goods; (2) an organization designed to increase efficiency; (3)
the "fullest use and best distribution of men, materials and industrial
capacity"; and (4) the development of new techniques and new markets.13'
In skeleton form, therefore, the Commission is to make findings of fact,
and then to compare those facts first with the statutory pattern of the basic
"one-third control" and other criteria, and second with the "public in-
terest" concept. There will, of course, be some overlapping of these steps in
practice. But often the additional and separate "public interest" criterion
-necessary for application of sanctions-will put a specific problem in a
considerably different light. In the recent Standard Oil of California case, 2
for example, the United States Supreme Court upheld an injunction against
exclusive dealing contracts between Standard and some 7000 service station
operators. Since in the specific factual context the existence of exclusive
dealerships was found likely to injure competition in violation of the Clayton
Act,6" the Court felt constrained to uphold the district court injunction de-
spite the fact that such an injunction might merely lead Standard to buy
out, or make agents of its dealers.6' Under the British Act, a different final
result would be.at least probable. Exclusive dealing contracts by one con-
56. "It is less the fact of monopoly that has to be proceeded against than certain
effects of monopolistic practices on national economic conditions." JOINT CoMM=TTEE o
THE LABOUR PARTY AID THE TRADES UNION CONGOESS ON TnusTs Am CAris, TnE
PUBLIC CONTROL OF MONOPOLY 2 (1947).
57. Monopolies Act § 14. The term was originally not defined at all. 449 H.C.
DEa 2035-6 (5th ser. 1948). Conservative proposals for criteria closely apprommated
what the Labour Party wanted. See 449 id. 2049-50. The present definition was agreed
upon by a Standing Committee and introduced, without objection, at the third reading.
58. Ibid.
59. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
60. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et seq. (1941).
61. See Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 310; id. at
319-20 (1949) (dissenting opinion) ; cf. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495, 534-7 (1948) (dissenting opinion); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 28
U.S. 344, 376 (1933) ; Comment, Refusals to Sell and Public Control of Competition, 58
YALE L.J. 1121 (1949). The majority felt itself bound in particular by its decision in
United States v. International Salt Co., 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
cern controlling over one-third of a substantial market would automatically
fall under the primary scope of the Act. 2 Further appraisal, however, of the
effect of those conditions on the "public interest" would involve considera-
tion of whether Standard's system of distribution was economically efficient,
whether it tended to encourage inertia in the industry, and what the effects
of an injunction would be. The answers to these questions, which are out-
side the judicial function of the American courts, 3 would be ultimately
determinative of government action.
In a sense, the public interest concept thus is, and was intended to be, a
statutory enactment of the American "rule of reason." 1 4 But there is a
definite difference in emphasis. Under the original American rule, the
reasonableness of the disputed action was weighed principally in the light
of normal and gentlemanly business methods. 5 The Monopolies Act
switches the standard from what is "normal" to what the contemporary
government wants in terms of economic results.68 For this reason, the Amer-
62. Monopolies Act § 3(1) a.
63. At least according to the majority in Standard Oil Co. of California v. 'United
States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). See id. at 311 n.14. Cf. Zlinkoff, Monopoly verstls Com-
pelition--Significant Trends in Patent, Anti-Trust, Trademark, and Unfair Competlition
Suits, 53 YALE L.J. 514, 516 (1944).
64. The American rule was formulated by Chief Justice White in Standard Oil Co.
of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911).
65. As originally put forth, the rule purported to carry the common law from which
the language of the Act came over into the intent and thrust of the Act. See Standard
Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50-62 (1911); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911). For an expression of doubt that Chief
Justice White correctly interpreted the common law, see HAvLER, A STUDY OF TUh CON-
STRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws 7-8 (TNEC Monograph
38, 1940). For an example of emphasis on the normality of growth, coinparc United States
v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920), with Standard Oil Co. of New Jer-
sey, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); see Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S.
293, 316-7 (1949) (dissenting opinion) ; United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed.
62, 79 (W.D.N.Y. 1915), appeal disnissed, 255 U.S. 578 (1921). But the method of
growth is no longer relevant when monopoly power is found. Sce Standard Oil Co. of
California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (exclusive dealerships) United
States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United States v. Griffith Amuse-
ment Co., 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940) (price fixing). See Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Pur-
pose?, 43 ILL. L. REV. 745, 750-63 (1949).
66. Economic necessity is no excuse under American law. E.g., Fashion Originators'
Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) ; United States v. Corn Products Refin-
ing Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S.D:N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919). But cf.
Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). Nor is improved efficiency
resulting from the illegal acts. See United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 208 Fed.
733, 744 (N.D. Ohio 1913).
'At least some British legislators failed to see any difference between the American
and British approaches. See 449 H.C. DEB. 2047 (5th ser. 1948) (to the effect that
under the American rule of reason, the court is able to decide whether a monopoly is
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ican concept of illegality per se could not be applied to conditions simply
because they are antithetical to competition.P If price-fixing arrangements
were under consideration in Britain, for example, the reasonableness of the
price would be relevant to the problem of sanctions, even if irrelevant to the
question of the applicability of the Act.cs What is one issue under the
American acts becomes two under the British. The "reasonableness" of a
restriction is there a question of the "public interest" of the moment.
Further, the fossilizing effect of stare decisis has been abrogated. The legal
weight of the language of decisions dealing with parallel practices but
different industries, and hence differing economic factors, has been lifted.3
The emphasis is on antitrust legislation as a flexible instrument of current
economic policy.
PROCEDURE UNDER THE ACT
This theory of draftsmanship-to coordinate the activities of the Mon-
opolies Commission with those of the national planners-is further evident
in the machinery through which the Act will work. The burden of fact-
finding and recommendation has been shifted from the judiciary, which is
felt unqualified for the job,70 to a policy-minded administrative body, ex-
perts on the problems of monopoly. And that body-the Monopolies and
Restrictive Practices Commission 7.1-is much under the thumb of the Board
of Trade, itself an instrument of central planning for commerce and industry.
Thus the Commission may be expected to sit as an arm of the planning
authority rather than as an independent enforcement agency.
The difference appears from the very beginning of proceedings under the
good or bad). Cf. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 311
n.14 (1949).
67. Cf. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-4 (1940).
68. Cf. United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
69. Cf. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 304-7 (1949).
70. "The kind of control needed to deal with this general situation is not so much ju-
dicial as administrative. . . . [The] effects [of monopoly] must be judged by reference to
considerations of the most efficient use of resources, the optimum level of output, the
stabilization of prices, etc., which are complex problems of economic policy not suscepti-
ble to solution by ethical judgments. What is required, therefore, is a fledble adminis-
trative control... ." JorNT Comsmx OF THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE TRADEs UNION
CoNGREss ox TRusTs AND CARTz S, THE PUBLic CoNTor or MoNoPoLy 2 (1947).
71. Monopolies Act § 1. The Commission was christened at the Third Reading.
452 H.C. DEB. 2166 (5th ser. 1948). See note 1 s.upra. Membership may vary from one
to ten. Term of office may vary depending from three to seven years, as specified by
The Board of Trade at the time of each appointment. The present membership consists
of: Sir Archibald Carter, C. N. Gallie, Frederick Grant, Mrs. Joan Robinson, Sir Harold
Saunders, Gordon Stott, The Hon. Josiah Wedgwood, and R. E. Yeabsley. Communi-
cation from British Information Services to the YALE LAW JouRN A, dated Oct. 24,
1949, in Yale Law Library. The EcONOMIST remarked in regard to this list, that, "[t]he
team may prove, as a team, more effective than the sum of its members.... But the
omens are not good." 156 Ecoxosnsr 95 (1949).
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Act, for the power to start the machinery in motion rests not in a law en-
forcement agency but in the Board of Trade.72 Acting on its own initiative,
or on basis of complaints received, 73 the Board sends a "reference" to the
Commission specifying the facts it is to investigate.74 Depending on the
circumstances, references are framed either to limit the Commission's
duties to investigation and report on the facts, or, at the discretion of the
Board, also to require recommendations for government action if the Com-
mission finds that "the conditions in question . . . operate or may be ex-
pected to operate against the public interest." 76 In addition, the Com-
mission may be required, at the request of the Board, to submit generalized
reports on specific practices.76
Provisions concerning the conduct of Commission hearings emphasize
the expedition of proceedings rather than the traditional protection of the
investigated. Subpoena powers are granted, along with concurrent power to
require production of documentary evidence relating to either past activity
or estimated future returns." Right to cross-examination, however, is
specifically abrogated. 7 The right to be heard is dependent on the Com-
mission's interpretation of what is "reasonably necessary" or "practi-
cable." 71 Calling of witnesses on behalf of the business in question is not
mentioned. With the exception of the attorney-client privilege," further-
more, rules of evidence and trial procedure presumably will not be followed;
72. Monopolies Act § 2. See 449 H.C. DEB. 2029 (5th ser. 1948).
73. Complaints received from certain groups must receive public acknowledgement
in the annual report of the Board of Trade, even if no reference is made to the Com-
mission. Monopolies Act § 16(3). Specifically these groups are consumer groups, trade
associations, industrial groups, agricultural groups, local governments, professional as-
sociations, and organized labor. Ibid. The last refers only to the T.U.C. The clause
will not apply if the Board feels there are "no substantial grounds" for the complaint. Ibid.
74. Monopolies Act § 6.
75. Ibid. The Commission is concerned with the desirability and form of remedy in
the latter case only. Id. § 7(2). A reference may be changed at any time, provided that
a request for a decision on the "public interest" question may not be withdrawn. Id.
§ 6 (4).
76. Monopolies Act § 15. This can be done only if the practices as utilized by par-
ticular industries have been previously dealt with by the Commission. Ibid. See 452
H.C. DEB. 2029-45 (5th ser. 1948).
77. Monopolies Act §8(3). In America, the Federal Trade Commission has been
granted similar powers. 38 STAT. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 49 (1941) (Federal Trade
Commission Act). For a description of the difficulties of building a case for judicial
action, see HAMIMTON & TmL, op. cit. supra note 12, at 45-57.
78. Monopolies Act §8(1). The Commission has, of course, the power to permit
cross-examination. Ibid.
79, Ibid. The right is limited to those who are substantially interested in the specific
investigation. That there is any such right at all is the result of a Conservative amend-
ment proposal. Both major parties supported the nonlegalistic approach in general. See
452 H.C. DEB. 2113-7 (5th ser. 1948).
80. This privilege is specifically retained in Monopolies Act § 8(5).
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the Commission is empowered to create its own procedure subject to the
direction of the Board of Trade.8 '
There is no provision for judicial review s. 8 2 Normally, reports of the Com-
mission are to be channeled through the Board of Trade to the House of
Commons. If the report was limited to a finding of the facts, however, the
Board may at its discretion pigeonhole it.3 Even if the report includes a
decision on the issue of the "public interest," the Board may vithin certain
limits suppress it in whole or in part. 4 And the Commission's recommenda-
tions need never be followed. Opportunity for Parliamentary reversal of the
executive decisions thus occurs when both the Commission and the Board
consider formal action necessary,85 but it will probably not be much eex-
ercised in practice. So long as the party in power has a workable majority,
the strictness of party-line voting and the great quantity of Parliamentary
work make it unlikely that recommendations of the President of the Board
of Trade will be thoroughly investigated, much less seriously contested.0
Furthermore, the Labour Government apparently intends to make fre-
quent use of sanctions not requiring Parliamentary approval.n Publicity
81. Monopolies Act § 8(1) (6). The Board in turn is responsible to Parliament, to
whom it must report procedural directions given the Commission. Id. § 8(7).
82. Judicial review was simply termed "undesirable!' in the preliminary report.
JOINT Co= =rrm OF THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE TRAnns UmoN CONGRESS o Tnusrs
AND CARTELS, THE PUBLIC CONTROL OF MONOPOLY 6 (1947). Its absence gave rise to no
opposition. This is in line with the Act's abrogation of the concept of adversary pro-
ceedings, and its treatment of the problem of monopoly as a purely economic, rather
than legal, question. See note 70"supra.
83. Monopolies Act § 9.
84. Ibid. In order to withhold the whole or part of any report not limited to a find-
ing of the facts, the Board must find that disclosure of the content of the report will do
injury to either the public interest, or, because of the existence of secret processes, etc.,
to the legitimate business interests of the parties concerned. Interpretation of the first
exception is left up to the Board without limitations. "Legitimate business interests,"
however, will be protected only if that can be done without affecting the "sense, clarity
or cogency" of the report. Ibid. Cf. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 7 S.E.C. 1033
(1939), aff'd, 110 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
85. Monopolies Act § 10(l). There is a loophole in this whereby action can be
initiated, by Parliament resolution, although the Commission reported the practices under
investigation as not operating against public interest. Ibid. Since this exception was
defended in Parliamentary debates by Board of Trade officials against Conservative at-
tacks, it seems likely that it is intended to operate as preservation of the executive,
rather than legislative, power of veto over the conclusions of the Commission. See 452
H.C. DEm. 2117-31 (5th ser. 1948). The Labour spokesman contended that the exception
would rarely be used, but was necessary in view of the vagueness of the "public interest"
concept. 452 id. 2121-3.
86. See 452 H.C. DEa. 2122 (5th ser. 1948) (use of Whips if going is hard); Offer,-
sive Against Monopoly, 154 EcoxOMIST 574, 575 (1948) (safeguard of Parliamentary
approval weakened by congestion of business and rigor of party discipline). Cf. Meier,
supra note 4, at 336.
87. See, e.g., 449 H.C. Dan. 2035 (5th ser. 1948) ; Cohen, supra note 5, at 487.
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and extra-legal recommendations can force the industry concerned to take
the desired action. The British Government holds powerful weapons in
price control, allocation of scarce materials, land-use legislation, and the
threat of nationalization of government subsidized competition." Backed
by the weight of such power, semi-official advice from the Board to a group
of business men is persuasive. If the advice is formally included in a Com-
mission report, further references may be made to ascertain whether the
recommendations are in fact being followed. 89 From the Government side,
this method of non-binding sanctions, inducing "voluntary" action by the
business concerned, has much to recommend it. By avoiding court action
and parliamentary debate, the Government gains speed and flexibility in
carrying out desired changes, as well as means of continuing supervision.
And from the business side, there is little to be gained by holding out for
formal sanctions. The chances of prevailing before Parliament are negligible,
and the imposition of formal sanctions only further restricts freedom of
decision.
Formal sanctions, mainly for use against recalcitrant or particularly long-
sinning groups,9 0 are provided in authority given for the issuance of min-
isterial orders. Procedurally, the order must be based on a parliamentary
resolution, following receipt by the House of Commons of a Commission
report-' In practice, it will be written by the President of the Board of
88. See Prices of Goods Act, 2 & 3 GEO. 6, 1939, c. 118 (price control); Goods and
Services (Price Control) Act, 4 & 5 Gao. 6, 1941, c. 31 (price control); Town and
Country Planning Act, 10 & 11 Gao. 6, 1947, c. 51 (land use allocation). Rationing
regulations are made under Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 2 & 3 GEO. 6, 1939, c. 62,
and Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 3 & 4 Gao. 6, 1940, c. 20. See also Industrial
Organization and Development Act, 10 & 11 Gao. 6, 1947, c. 40 (setting up local de-
velopment councils) ; Borrowing (Control and Guarantees) Act, 9 & 10 Go. 6, 1946,
c. 58.
89. Monopolies Act § 12. This action may be taken also when recommendations have
been made by competent authorities. Ibid. See note 92 infra Recommendations thus
made are not backed by any legal sanctions, and may therefore be made even when the
Commission's report has been limited to a finding of the facts. In this case, there is, of
course, no parliamentary review at all.
90. Publicity is expected normally to provide sufficient reason for a monopolistic
group' to change its habits. See 449 H.C. DEB. 2035 (5th ser. 1948).
91. Monopolies Act § 10. There are four prerequisites to such an order: (1) a refer.
ence to the Commission not so framed as to limit the investigation and report to the
facts; (2) the laying of the report before Parliament, with or without omissions; (3) a
finding by the Commission in its report that the Act is applicable; and (4) either a
finding by the Commission that the conditions investigated operate against the public
interest, or a resolution to that effect by the House of Commons. The first two limita-
tions provide the Board of Trade with a screening process which can effectively Prevent
positive action. The latter clause of the last limitation gives it the opportunity of over-
ruling the Commission. See note 85 supra.
Ministerial orders generally are designed to permit legislation by administrative and
executive 'agencies. The process of specifying particular law from the basis of a broad
grant of power from the legislature is parallel to the rule-making powers of such Ameri-
can agencies of the Treasury, or the Office of Price Administration. But the British
system of orders goes further, and in effect permits generic delegated legislation. For a
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Trade, or the Minister most directly concerned, and then submitted to
Parliament for official blessing. The Board of Trade is not the sole director
of the British economy, simply the best place in which to locate control of
the investigatory and recommendation functions of any administrative
body concerned with the activities of British industry hi general. At times
the Monopolies Commission may be required to look into the practices of an
industry falling within the jurisdiction of a Minister other than the Presi-
dent of the Board of Trade. The Act is therefore framed to prevent inter-
departmental conflict by permitting the Minister under whose direction
the business in question most readily falls to issue the order, and see to its
enforcement. 92 In any case, no order can be couched in other than language
of prohibition-i.e., it cannot command dissolution or divestiture. But
the range of its scope may be broader than, for example, an FTC cease and
desist order in America; it may be applicable to specific persons only, or may
declare certain practices to be unlawful in general, thus in effect enacting
new legislation.9 4 Enforcement rests in the courts, which must respect a
governmental request for an injunction if an order is not obeyed.P
specific example under the Monopolies Act, see note 94 infra. The majority of statutory
orders, covering rationing, land confiscation, etc., are made under the Emergency Powers
(Defense) Act, 2 & 3 GEo. 6, 1939, c. 62, which is still in force. See, e.g., Rctevic of
Current Legislationz-Great Britain, 29 J. Comip. LEG. & INT'L L. 1 (1947); WAD &
PaUJ.JPs, CoNsrrrurloNAL. LAW 241-2, and c. 5 (3d ed. 1946), reviewed in 29 J. Compe.
LEG. & INT'L L., Parts 3 & 4, at 63 (1947).
92. Monopolies Act § 10(2). In addition to the Board of Trade, the following au-
thorities may issue orders under the Act: Minister of Supply, Minister of Works, Min-
ister of Fuel and Power, Minister of Health, Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, the
Admiralty, Minister of Food, and the Secretary of State. Id. § 20(1).
93. Specifically, authorization is given to forbid any agreements or arrangements,
past or prospective, which are considered undesirable, to outlaw boycotts, including re-
fusal to sell (cf. Comment, Refusals to Sell and Public Control of Competition, 58 YALE
LJ. 1121 n.1 (1949)), and to declare unlawful preferential rebates, or other forms of
customer preferences, and tying contracts, exclusive dealerships, and the like. Monopolies
Act § 10(2). The absence of the dissolution and divestiture remedies is to be expected in
view of the limited purpose of the Act. See pages 904-5 supra. There will be no "un-
scrambling of the eggs." Movement against non-use, however, may in effect constitute a
form of compulsory licencing.
94. Monopolies Act § 10(3). For example, the Electric Lamp Manufacturers' Asso-
ciation has already been referred to the Monopolies Commission for study. Communica-
tion to the YALE LAw JouRNAL from the British Information Services, dated October 24,
1949, in Yale Law Library. This "classic of the te.'dbooks" has reportedly gained a
monopoly through use of a patent pool, and maintained it through resale price maintain-
ance, sales quotas, and production restrictions. See LEwIS, op. Cit. s.upra note 3, at 12;
LucAs, op. cit. supra note 8, at 64; 449 H.C. Dun. 2054-8 (5th ser. 1948). Any Minis-
terial order made on the basis of the Commission's report may either require the Asso-
ciation to discontinue, for instance, its sales and production quota systems, or may declare
all such systems, no matter by whom instituted, to be henceforth unlawful.
This method of sanction is close to the American doctrine of illegality per se. Use
made of it, however, will probably be limited, since only the results, never the form, of
restrictive practices are the target of the Act. See page 904 supra.
95. See 449 H.C. Dun. 2037 (5th ser. 1948). An injured private party may also ask
1950]
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No criminal sanctions are provided." This divergence from the American
scheme reflects the fundamental British moral attitude towards the Mo-
nopolies Act. The keynote is cooperation between government and indus-
try to create a productive economy, without regard to the ethical character
of monopolistic practices.97 A decision adverse to a private concern thus
contains no more of an implication of moral turpitude than does a rate-
fixing order after a hearing by the Federal Power Commission.
This concept of monopoly as a purely economic problem accounts also
for the arbitrary procedure and limited opportunity for review embodied in
the Act. The manifest lack of "due process" may or may not be as bad as
it looks, depending on one's political philosophy. The Labour Government
considers itself the instrument of the people in creating social and economic
welfare for the nation at large.98 In the industrial world, it must control
what it does not own. To this end it has established an administrative board
of experts on monopoly, charged with implementing and coordinating policy,
and free to discuss each case on the level of what are considered to be the
only relevant questions-the effects of the conditions under investigation,
and the desirability and form of sanction. To its way of thinking, the
Government has the power to control completely all aspects of the national
economy; that it has chosen to control only partly does not mean that it
must run the risk of legalistic confusion of issues, lengthy and expensive
judicial proceedings, possible court reversals, and seeping dilution of its
economic policies. The need for application of legal standards has thus been
kept to a minimum, while the responsibility for making the necessary polit-
ical-economic decisions has been placed in the hands of personnel trained
and free to think in those terms. 0
for an injunction against further disobedience of an order issued under the Act. Ibid.
The court cannot review the findings of the Commission as to the applicability of the Act.
Hence, such issues as what is a restraint on competition, or what constitutes one-third
control over an industry will not come up unless the order which is alleged to have been
violated contains some such language. The validity of the order can be questioned only
on constitutional grounds, if the authority issuing the order can be shown to have ex-
ceeded the powers granted by the Act. Since the orders will already have parliamentary
approval, this possibility is practically non-existent. -See Review of Current Legislationl,
29 J. Coup. LEa. & INT'L L. 1-2 (1947).
96. Monopolies Act § 18 provides criminal penalties for anyone convicted of an
"offense" under the Act. The sole purpose of this clause is to give teeth to the subpoena
and other investigatory powers of the Commission. See id. § 8(3).
97. "A monopoly is neither good nor bad in itself, but it has the power to be either
good or bad." Harold Wilson, President of the Board of Trade, at the Second Reading,
449 H.C. DEn. 2021 (5th ser. 1948).
98. A typical statement of the Labour position was made by Clement Attlee during
the political campaign of February, 1950: "Labor does not believe that men and women
should be required to submit their lives to the indiscriminate play of blind economic
forces. It believes that men can control their economic environment and must be free to
do so." Quoted in the N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1950, § 6, p. 24. See also W1LLIAS, Tn
TxpruE CHALLENGE 99-109 (1948).
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THE AMERICAN CONTRAST
The British anti-monopoly program differs from its American counterpart
both in substance and procedure. The British attempt is to regulate the
policies of monopolized industries rather than to thrust competition upon
them, and they start unhampered by a haphazard pyramiding of sometimes
conificting legislation."' Moreover, the regulation is virtually divorced from
the courts, and is coordinated on the administrative level with over-all
economic policy. American procedures, on the other hand, have depended
heavily on the judiciary and have never been systematically meshed into a
coherent regulatory scheme. The United States may wish to borrow little
from the British economic philosophy. But the history of American attempts
to promote competition indicates that the British administrative machinery
might prove useful indeed.
In contrast to current English theory, the traditional basis of American
antitrust legislation is preservation of the competitive system."" Competi-
tion is the spice of life: theoretically, the automatic mechanism of the com-
petitive market creates both fair prices and the desired distribution of corn-
modities. The need for pleasing the consumer places a premium on lower
prices, better products, individual initiative, and increased economy and
efficiency in production and distribution.' 0' Beyond this, the theory of
competition is tied in with the foundations of a total philosophy. Polit-
ically and socially, it is a part of pluralism and democracy, of decentraliza-
tion of power. It serves to protect a democratically created government
against the essentially dictatorial power of industrial giantism. The ramifi-
cations of an economic theory are deeply ingrained in the concept of "Amer-
icanism." 102
But the theory received hard knocks from the first. The rapid expansion
of industrial power in the latter half of the nineteenth century gave rise in
99. Contrast the sixty years' patchwork of American legislation. See pages 918-9
infra.
100. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 n.15 (1940).
101. See, e.g., SAmXuELso, EcoNomcs-AN IxnmoDucroRY Aw-LYsrs 35-8 (1948).
102. Distrust of monopoly power is in fact rooted in the thought of the Founding
Fathers. Jefferson was in favor of a constitutional restriction on monopolies. Letter to
James Madison, dated December 20, 1787, in THOmAS JFFEnsori, Lir AD SELEcrzD
WRmxGs 437 (Modern Library ed., 1944), quoted at the head of Rostow, Monopoly
under the Sizeruwn Act-Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. REv. 745 (1949). But the mod-
ern theory of laissez-faire was no part of this distrust. Price-fixing and public owner-
ship of business enterprise were common in the first half of the nineteenth century, and
were challenged only on practical grounds. The modern concept of an A erian heritage
of freedom from positive government action in the economic sphere mas largely a cre-
ation of the post-Civil War period. For a case study of the rise of the laissez-faire
concept in Pennsylvania, see HARTz, EcoNomic PoLIcy A- DEMsocnAIc THouGHT,
passim and especially Part IV, The Myth of Laissez-Faire (1948).
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America to flagrant abuses. The age of the robber barons began.1"3 When
it became clear that competition was not self-perpetuating, the Sherman
Act was enacted, making it a crime to "monopolize, or attempt to monop-
olize . . . any part of the trade . . . between the several States," and
declaring all contracts in restraint of trade to be illegal. 0 4 Judging from the
sweep of the language alone, the intent of the Act, prima facie, seemed cleart
to stop the concentration of economic power, and to restore to the economy
the protection of free competition. 1 5 However, despite the "comprehen-
siveness of the enumerations embodied in both the 1st and 2d sections,"
Congress had failed to include "any direct prohibition against monopoly in
the concrete." 106 A brief flurry of dissolution decrees blew up, swept across
certain sectors of the economy, and was dissipated.
117 After the United
States Steel decision in 1920,108 the Sherman Act became a hazy edition of
what the British Act is now, a weapon to restrain abuse rather than to de-
stroy the monopoly power giving rise to the abuse.109 And while the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act 110 and the Clayton Act,"1 both enacted in
1914, were framed in terms of restoring competition, they actually reached
only symptoms.
1 1 2
103. See JosEPHsoN, THEv RoBBER BARONS (1934); Hicxs, HIGH FINANCE IN TIlE
SI'XIEs (1929).
104. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1946).
105. The language of the Act is almost the only criterion by which intent can be
judged. The Act was not a carefully worked out measure, but rather an automatic po-
litical response to the strong public sentiment against the trusts of the time. It was
passed with only one dissenting vote, after five days' debate, but no hearings whatsoever.
See FAINSOD & GORDON, GOVERNMENT .AND THE AMERicAIT EcoNoMY 450-2 (1941); cf.
PURDY, LINDAHL, & CARTER, CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 302-3
(1942). The legislative history of the Act is given in some detail in WALER-, HIsToRY
OF THE SHEImAN LAW 1-46 (1910).
106. See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911).
107. In 1911, dissolution decrees were granted in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106 (1911). See note 133 infra.
108. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
109. See Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315-17 (1949)
(dissenting opinion). For the thesis that the legal and economic standards of monopoly
were then far apart, see Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34
(1937).
110. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1946).
111. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1946).
112. Both the F.T.C. Act and the Clayton Act were directed against business methods
which operated to restrict competition, and hence might lead to monopoly, rather than
against the existence of monopoly power. Remedies available to the Commission were
therefore restricted to cease and 'desist orders. See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S.
683, 693 (1948). The Clayton Act was criticized at its inception by Senator Reed for
weakness in language and scope. 51 CoNo. REc. 15825 (1914); see Kefauver, Thc Su-
preme Court and Congress versus Monopoly, 20 TENN. L. Rxv. 254, 256 (1948). If the
criticism was not valid at the time, it was later justified by judicial emasculation of § 7,
which was directed against growth by merger. See Kefauver, supra, at 264-8; OPPEN-
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Subsequent decades witnessed the growth of a fundamentally different
philosophy, masquerading under the old symbols. "New competition,"
a move towards cooperative self-government in the business world, was
born in the 1920's."' With the NRA experiment, 14 the term became "fair
competition." The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 "65-though passed as a
plausible attempt to tighten the Clayton Act's strictures against "price
discrimination"-became in application a vehicle for the protection of small
competitors rather than of the process of competitive change. The recent
Standard Oil Co. of Indiana decision,"' for example, in effect enforced retail
price maintenance in order to protect independently owned retail gas sta-
tions. And the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 bestowed congressional blessing
on state "fair trade" laws, which openly proscribe price competition on the
retail level." 7 In brief, the spirit of this trend was not the spirit of "com-
petition," but of "live and let live," a policy of insulating powerful distribu-
tor groups and tiny distributor satellites alike from competitive unrest.
Subsequent antitrust decisions have tended to reverse this trend. One
group of decisions, under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Section 3 of the
Clayton Act, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, have
struck vigorously at practices and methods whereby monopoly power is
made effective. Now illegal per se, or virtually so, are tie-in sales, group
boycotts, and any agreements which affect price.lu The scope of monopoly
power under a patent has been severely circumscribed: it is doubtful that
patentees can under any but the most limited circumstances fix the prices
aEnI, op. cit. supra note 6, at 266-7; PuRnY, LDAH., & CARTER, op. cit. supra note 105,
at 383-9. This weakness has evoked strong pressure for legislative overruling of the
judicial rule. See, e.g., HousE Com-m=rm oN SmALL BusiNEss, RPor ox Mo:xorous-
TIC ANm UxFAIR TRADE PRAcriCES, H.R. R. No. 2465, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1948).
113. See generally BuRNxs, THE DEscuE OF COMErrTioN (1936). For references to
other material, see bibliography in id. at 591-604.
114. National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 195 (1933), declared unconstitu-
tional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
115. The Robinson-Patman Act, striking at preferential price rates, was enacted as
an amendment to § 2 of the Clayton Act. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946).
See page 920 infra.
116. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. granted, 338 U.S. 865
(1949). See Adelman, Integration andAntitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. Rsv. 27, 60-74 (1949) ;
Note, The Szinging Door-Or How To Obey One Antitrust Law By Violating Another,
59 YALE L.J. 158 (1949).
117. The Mfiller-Tydings Act, exempting certain types of resale price maintenance,
and thus preventing price wars, was made an amendment to § 1 of the Sherman Act.
50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1946).
118. Tie-in sales: International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), 57
YALE L.J. 1298 (1948). Group boycotts: Associated Press v. United States, 32-6 U.S. 1
(1945); Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). See
Comment, Refusals to Sell and Public Control of Conpetition, 58 YALE L.J. 1121, 1136-40
(1949). Price agreements: FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); United
States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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which their licensees may charge. 9 Moreover, any antitrust law violations
connected with the licensing of patents may constitute a defense to a suit
by the patentee for infringement or for royalties. 20
But potentially the most far-reaching group of decisions have been those
re-invigorating Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 2' Where monopoly exists,
according to these decisions, the gentlemanliness of policy, or the normality
of growth, constitute no excuse. The existence of the power is the violation,
no matter how innocently the power is used, unless it was "thrust upon"
the industry.' 2' And one implication seems to be, although it is not a
necessary one, that the purpose of the Sherman Act is to preserve an atom-
ized economic structure, "to perpetuate . . . for its own sake and in spite
of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units" " 3-to recon-
stitute, in short, the "ideal" competitive system as the American system of
free enterprise.
THE PATH OF THE FUTUR
To the extent that the "new" Sherman Act decisions identify the existence
of small business with the existence of competition, they bring into sharper
focus a conflict already institutionalized in the co-existence of the Robin-
son-Patman and Miller-Tydings Acts with the basic antitrust laws. The
size of giant corporations may raise problems which must be dealt with
through some form of government action. But the decision must be made
whether these problems can best be handled by penalizing competitive
success, and protecting "in spite of possible cost" expensive means of pro-
duction and distribution. Government-sanctioned wholesale and retail
price maintenance may aid small business. It does not follow that it there-
fore is an aid in maintaining effective competition. If competition is to en-
dure as an economic ideal, legal methods of restraining it under a verbal
guise of restoring it should be discarded.
1 4
119. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) ; United States
v. Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
120. Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944)
Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
121. The principal cases are United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131
(1948) ; Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948) ; United States v.
Griffith Amusement Co., 334 U.S. 100 (1948) ; American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781 (1946); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) ; cf. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
122. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir.
1945). Judge Hand's language was specifically approved in American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813-4 (1946). See Rostow, The New Sherman Act; A
Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. oF Cnr. L. Ray. 567, 577-80 (1947).
123. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
124. Two recent cases pointing up the conflict are Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v.
FTC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949); cert. granted, 338 U.S. 865 (1949), and United
States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
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The Miller-Tydings and Robinson-Patman Acts aside, the antitrust laws
have in some ways been a notable success. The incipieuit monopolist has
been restrained, both through positive action and the deterrent effect of
the threat of action, from widespread use of restrictive practices and unfair
methods of competition. The robber barons have been stopped-complete
and ruthless control of industry is extinct. 121 Despite appropriations difficul-
ties-the "big act little stick" shortage 12G_, there is no lack of energy in
attempting to enforce the law. The Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice had, in November 1949, one hundred and twenty-seven cases
pending against large concerns."-7 Moreover, the government will probably
get a decision in its favor, if not an effective remedy, in them all; to that
extent it wins practically all the actions it brings.'2' Yet the problem of
monopoly in American industry remains pressing.1m The alternatives are
becoming clearer; if antitrust action cannot counteract the impulse towards
concentration of private economic power, at some point that power vill be
taken from private hands.131 It is time for a reappraisal. 3 '
References to discussions of the problem are given in Note, The Swinging Door-Or
How To Obey One Antitrust Law by Violatig Another, 59 YA.E LJ. 153 (1949), and
Note, Trouble Begins in the "New" Sherman Act: The Perplexing Story of the A&P
Case, 58 YAlm LJ. 969 (1949).
125. The contrast with the English experience of bypassing antitrust law is striking.
See Rostow, Monopoly under the Sherman Act-Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL L. Rrv.
745, 750 (1949), quoting YELVEiRrON & TERBOUGH, op. cit. supra note 17, at 65; Offensive
Against Monopoly, 154 EcoNOUIST 574, 575 (1948)("[T]here are few symptoms in
America of that acquiescence in restriction, that fear of dynamic change, that conviction
that competition is a Bad Thing, which in England characterizes not only monopolistic
big business but practically every class of society").
126. The phrase is used in the discussion of the problem of appropriations in Hamilton
& Till, Antitrust in Action 23-6 (TNEC Monograph 16, 1940). See also Arnold, Anti-
trust Law Enforcement, Past and Future, 7 LAw AND COMSTIaI. PRoi. 5, 9-10 (1940).
127. The cases are listed and summarized in a communication to the YALE LAW
Jo-vuAL. from Herbert A. Bergson, Assistant Attorney General, dated Nov. 10, 1949, in
Yale Law Library.
128. For statistics prior to 1940, see Hamilton & Till, Antitrust in Action 121-40
(TNEC Monograph 16, 1940). See also note 133 infra.
129. For example, the census of manufacturers taken in 1947 shows nineteen major
industries to be concentrated to the extent of 855 or more in four companies or less.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1949, p. 1, col. 5. Such statistics do not show up the tremendous
size of companies whose power is spread over more than one industry. For a breakdown
of the scope of the activities of E. .Du Pont de Nemours & Co., whose sales in 1946
totalled over three-quarters of a billion dollars, see EDWARDs, MAINTAIN= C0esu'Lr-
TIoN 100 n.14 (1949).
The size of American industrial giants tends to evoke statement that monopoly itself
is increasing. See, e.g., Callmann, The Essence of Antitrust, 49 Con, L. R1v. 1100 (1949).
The evidence seems inconclusive. See discussion and citations in Adelman, Effective Com-
petition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HAnv. L. Rnv. 1289, 1291-7 (1948); Houghton,
The Progress of Concentration in Industry, 38 A. Ecox. Rsv. SuPP. 72 (1948).
130. See Houss Co rrnm ox SmALL BusmmNss, REoRT oT MfoNoPoIsTI A,ND Un-
:'m Ta.E PRcrs 29-33, H.R. REP. No. 2465, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) (effective
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The least exacting policy road lies behind us. It would be possible to
turn back to the pre-war path. This is not really as much of a path as a
merry-go-round, on which the government rides, slaying an ogre on one
trip around only to meet him again, bigger and stronger, albeit politer, on
the next. When coupled with successful attacks on collusive restraints of
competition and unfair methods of competition, such a policy has the ad-
vantage of preventing most abuses, and thus to some degree limiting the
antitrust laws stressed as the only alternative to "authoritarian economic system");
TNEC, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8-9 (1941) (the alternative to competi-
tion is some form of concentrated government authority). A wartime policy statement
by the British Labour Party attributed the failure of the capitalist system partially to
the ham-stringing of industry by monopolistic combinations. NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COM-
MITTEE OF LABOUR PARTY, FULL EMPLOYMENT AND FINANCIAL POLICY 2 (1944). For
the thesis that industrial dynamism inevitably leads to giantism and hence to socialism,
by a process of "Creative Destruction," see SCIuMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY, passim (1942).
131. The need for a reappraisal has been recognized by the Government. Between
1938 and 1941, the Temporary National Economic Committee launched a detailed analysis
of the concentration of economic power in American industry, and reported their findings
in 43 monographs and two reports. For a listing of these, see OPPENHEIM, op. cit, supra
note 6, at 83-5. The work of the Committee has been termed a failure. Galbraith,
Monopoly and the Concentration of Economic Power in ELLIS, A SURvEY OF CONTEMPO-
RARY ECONOmiCs 122-4 (1948). But whether or not the criticism of over-conservatism is
valid, the Committee supplied two elements essential to a successful revitalization of the
antitrust laws: publicity and a mass of source material.
Since the war, more work has been done. The work of the Congressional Committee
on Small Business has resulted in two major reports. STAFF REPORT TO THE MOXtOPOLY
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, UNITED STATES VERSUS
ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND MONOPOLY (1946); and Hous. COMMITTEE oN SMALL
BUSINESS, REPORT ON MONOPOLISTIC AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES, H.R. REP. No. 2465,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). The Federal Trade Commission has made a series of re-
ports. E.g., FTC, THE PRESENT TREND OF CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
(1947). More recently, the problem of monopoly has been under scrutiny by a Subcom-
mittee of the House Judiciary Committee, under the direction of Representative Celler of
New York. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1949, § 4, p. 7, col. 1-2. Partially as a result of
the findings of this committee, the President has directed Secretary of Commerce Sawyer
to head a committee to prepare a "positive" approach to the prevention of monopoly.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1949, p. 1, col. 4. What this means is not yet clear.
The danger of government control poses a difficult problem to business men. It is
said that they approve of antitrust law enforcement only in theory. See McDonald,
Buinessmen and the Sherman Acf, Fortune, Jan. 1950, p. 104. If this is so, they may be
walking into a trap. "Those people, in and out of the halls of government, who encour-
age the growing restriction of competition . . . are shouldering a terrific responsibility.
Consciously, or unconsciously, they are working for centralized business and financial
control. Consciously, or unconsciously, they are therefore either working for control of
the Government itself by business and finance or the other alternative-a growing con-
centration of public power in the Government to cope with such concentration of private
power. The enforcement of free competition is the least regulation business can expect."
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 313 (1938), quoted in Zlink-
off, op. cit. sitpra note 63, at 514 n.1.
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power of the combinations it is helpless to control or destroy. But its result
is that competition continues to be more of a myth than a reality, without
any decision having been made whether competition in any particular in-
dustry is either desirable or possible. Moreover, it leaves concentrated
power in the hands of a self-elected and self-perpetuating class of industrial
management, and does so by default, not as a result of a conscious policy.
Through the "new" Sherman Act decisions, 32 the United States Supreme
Court has given a more promising answer. But the answer is not complete.
A policy decision made in the courts does not entail the broad follow-up
action attendant on the voice of the legislature or the executive. Available
judicial sanctions may not be capable of making substance of the words in
the opinions. 133 Announcement of a new doctrine by the judiciary does not
mean that other branches of the government are prepared to go along with
it; a government sale of a strategically located plant to an industrial giant
belies the sweep of Supreme Court language. 134 No judicial doctrine can
compel the bringing of the right action at the right time.
Moreover, the economic issues are still in flux. The Court's criteria now
go beyond the outward manifestations of restraints on competition-
collusion and abuse-to the economic fact of lack of competition. Yet this
132. The phrase is from Rostow, The New Sherman Act; A Positke Instrument of
Progress, 14 U. OF CHL L. REv. 567 (1947). Cf. Galbraith, op. cit. supra note 131, at 118
n.46.
133. In the depression year of 1932, the American Tobacco Company made a net
profit of over $100,000,000. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 805
(1946). The penalty imposed for their monopolization, in one of the leading cases under
the "new" Sherman Act, was fines amounting to $255,000. Id. at 783. No action has yet
been taken under the decision in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945). Control of the market in aluminum is now in the hands of three
companies, and it is at least doubtful that any action can be taken. See N.Y. Times, Dec.
5, 1949, p. 33, col. 4; Kefauver, The Supreme Court and Congress versus 3fonopoly, 20
TEYxr. L. Rxv. 254, 262-4 (1948); Rostow, Monopoly under the Shennan. Act-Power
or Purpose?, 43 ILT. L. REv. 745, 780 (1949).
The 1946 decision was the second time the American Tobacco Company was found
to be a monopoly. The first time it was dissolved. United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). Mr. Justice Brandeis remarked that the decree was based on
a new constitutional prohibition: "What man has illegally joined together, let no court
put asunder." BRa xDns, THE CURsE OF BxGN.sS 103 (1934).
134. The United States Steel Corporation refrained from bidding for the important
plant at Geneva, Utah, which was offered by the War Assets Administration, on the
grounds that further expansion might violate the antitrust laws. Upon Government urg-
ing, backed by the opinion of the Attorney-General that acquisition of the plant would
not constitute a Sherman Act violation, the Corporation submitted a bid. The bid was
successful. Following their usual pattern of integration, the Corporation then acquired
the assets of the Columbia Steel Co. in Oregon. At this point, the Department of Justice
commenced an action under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Co-
lumbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 503-7 (1948); Rostow, Monopoly under the Sherman
Act-Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. REV. 745, 785-7 (1949). Congress has received
recommendations that more cooperation with the antitrust program be required from the
various government agencies. See STAFF REPORT, op. cit. supra note 131, at 14.
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is a restatement of the problem, rather than a solution. The question of
identifying the factual meaning of the operative word "competition" has
given rise to a trichotomy of tests: 131
(1) Whether there is concentrated control of the market in the industry
concerned, i.e., whether there is a lack of alternative sources of supply
available to the buyer, or alternative buyers from the point of view of the
seller.' This is the structure test.
(2) Whether the conditions in the industry are such as to put a premium on
business vitality-production, efficiency, invention, and reasonable price
flexibility in response to reductions in cost.' This is the performance test.
(3) A compromise, both factors to be considered simultaneously. 13 This
may be called the optimum benefit test.
The debate over the "new" Sherman Act is couched in terms of the mean-
ing of "competition." 139 Behind it lies the fact that not all industries can be
dealt with according to generic legal formulae. The structure test is closely
allied to the basic tenets of the American free enterprise system; strictly
applied, it would lead to a large degree of atomization and a corresponding
revival of small business. 1 0 But it is at least doubtful that all industries
should be atomized. For technological reasons, some degree of bigness must
135. See McDonald, Businessmen and the Sherman, Act, Fortune, Jan. 1950, p. 104.
"Competition" under the "new" Sherman Act probably does not refer to the pure compe-
tition of the classical economists, but to "workable competition," the availability of
alternatives, explained in Clark, Towards a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 A~t.
EcoN. REv. 241 (1940). See Mason, Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the
United States, 62 HARv. L. Rav. 1265, 1267-8 (1949).
136. See EDWARDS, MAINTAINING ComPrrnro 92-7 (1949); Edwards, Preserving
Competition versits Regulating Monopoly-Can the Antitrust Laws Preserve Cornpeti-
tion?, 30 Am. EcoN. Rnv. Supp. 164, 170-1 (1940); Rostow, Monopoly under the Sher-
man Act-Power or Purpose?, 43 liL. L. Rzv. 745, 778 (1949). A morwe stringent
version of this test has been proposed recently: that the essence of the antitrust laws Is
that all business must be conducted in a competitive fighting spirit. See Callmann, The
Essence of Antitrust, 49 CoL. L. REv. 1100, 1109-10 (1949).
137. See Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. Rruv. 27, 41-50
(1949); Adelman, Effective Competition and the Atditrust Laws, 61 HAitv. L. REv. 128),
1302-4 (1948).
138. See Mason, Curren1 Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62
HARv. L. REv. 1265, 1280-3 (1949).
139. The word can apparently be used to justify almost any type of economic be-
haviour. At hearings before a Senate Committee in 1948, for example, a spokesman for
Bethlehem Steel was asked why a price raise instituted by Bethlehem exactly paralleled
a prior one by United States Steel. His reply was that "one of our salesmen learned
that the United States Steel Co. had increased the price, and so, to be competitive, we
increased it also." Quoted in Rostow, Monopoly under the Sherman Act-Power or
Purpose?, .43 Iii. L. Rav. 745, 783 (1949). Cf. United States Matsters Association v.
FTC, 152 F2d 161, 164-5 (7th Cir. 1945).
140. See Rostfow, Monopoly under the Sherman Act-Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL L.
REv. 745, 790-3 (1949)."
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be tolerated.141 The performance test is designed to meet this difficulty. It
follows more closely the lines of the British Monopolies Act; its basic criteria
are the benefits attributed to competition, whether or not a competitive
market structure exists in fact.142 Either test may be economically desirable
in a given situation-hence the compromise optimum benefit test-, but
the combination of the two leaves unanswered two basic questions: how to
decide which should be applied, and what to do with those sectors of the
economy where effective competition is not possible.
The conflict is thus in reality not over the scope of the antitrust laws,
which apply to all monopoly, but over the remedies applicable to various
industries. Some of the necessary remedies the antitrust laws do not supply.
The government should have the power to take action against industrial
concentration whether the appropriate action involves atomization, super-
vision to prevent abuse, or continuing regulation. But the decision as to
precisely what result is desired from particular government action must be
made carefully by personnel oriented towards a positive integrated program.
There are certain areas-communications, municipal power supply, and the
like-where competition is not feasible, and there are further areas where it
may be economically disastrous. A dual approach is needed, consisting of
regulation, or at least supervision of economic policies, in those areas, and
restoration of effective competition in all others. The policy of this plan
may be briefly defined as decentralization of monopolistic economic power
wherever possible, and democratization through public control wherever not.
The system to which it leads is an adaptation to a mechanized age of the
traditional policy of American antitrust legislation.
Implementation of this program would not require drastic rewriting of
the antitrust laws. The Federal Trade Commission Act 4 and the Clayton
Act,'" with Section 7 amended to prohibit merger by purchase of assets as
well as by purchase of stock, are adequate to deal with the business methods
which may lead to monopoly power. The Sherman Act permits dissolution
and divestiture. Recommendations to the legislature have already been
made which are sufficient to lay the groundwork for an approach to existent
concentration of economic power. 45 The first action to be taken is an in-
141. See, e.g., EnwARDs, MAINTAINING Commrrrrou 156 (1949). For a brief cate-
gorization of conflicting results following application of the structure test without regard
to business performance, see Mason, op. cit. sipra note 138, at 1269-71. Cf. Edvmrds,
Preserving Competition versts Regulating Monopoly--Can the Alntitrust Laws Pre-
serve Competition?, 30 AM. EcoN. REv. Supp. 164, 166-7 (1940) ; Rostow, A Reply, 57 J.
Poy. EcoN. 60 (1949).
142. See, e.g., Bain, Rosto-w's Proposals for Petroleum Policy, 57 J. Por- Eco:;. 55
(1949) ; Mason, op. cit. supra note 138, at 1267-8, 1276; Adelman, Effective Compcition
and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1349--O (1948).
143. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 et. req. (1946).
144. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 et..rq. (1946). See note 112 stipra.
145. STAFF R.EpoRr, op. cit. supra note 131, at 11-17. See also Housc Cowm=xnra or
SmA.Lu BusiNrss, op. cit. supra note 131, at 24-9. For citations to leading industry-by-
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dustry by industry analysis by the FTC in cooperation with other executive
agencies. This can be initiated by executive order. It should be followed by
systematic and coordinated action by the FTC and the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice. For purposes of the program outlined above,
the atomization of industries designated by the FTC findings as susceptible
to decentralization can be effected through court proceedings brought by
the Antitrust Division. 14 6 The specific remedies asked should be based on
detailed recommendations from the FTC.14 7 Where performance competi-
tion exists, and atomization is either unnecessary or undesirable, continuous
quashing of restrictive practices can be effected through FTC cease and
desist powers. Industries in which dissipation of monopoly control is not
feasible can best be regulated under separate legislation, authorizing, for
example, a permanent commission to control and collaborate on the economic
policies within the industry. 14 8 Until legislative action is taken, the anti-
trust laws and regulatory powers of existing executive agencies afford a
means of supervision of the industry to the extent of prevention of abuses.
This program constitutes a partial acceptance of the British approach
industry studies that have already been published, see footnotes in Bain, Price and
Production Policies in ELLIS, A SURvEY OF CONTEMPORARY EcoNoMIcs 129 (19-18).
146. This is necessary under existing law since the remedies available to the FTC
are limited to what can be accomplished through a cease and desist order. 38 STrAT. 717,
§ 5(a) (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1946). The administrative process, however, seem,,
better suited to the trial of extremely complicated technological and economic issues.
See Edwards, op. cit. supra note 136, at 172-4. At any rate, close cooperation between
the FTC as original investigator and the Antitrust Division as prosecutor is essential
to the success of a planned attack. See Mason, op. cit. supra note 138, at 1284-5.
The current criteria of the Sherman Act seem adequate to give legal sanction to such
an attack. See cases cited in note 121 supra. If future case law proves them to be in-
adequate, legislative expansion of the scope of the Sherman Act -%il be necessary beform
any program directed against concentration of economic power can be successfully car-
ried out.
147. The FTC is specifically authorized to act as a master in chancery to ascertain
and report an appropriate form of remedy. 38 STAT. 717, § 7 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 47
(1946). The section was used early, in United States v. Corn Products Refining Co.,
234 Fed. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919). For some reason
it has since been used rarely, if at all.
For treatment of the method of atomization of a particular industry, see RoSTow, A
NATIONAL PoucY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY (1948). For discussion of supplementary legal
changes that may be required, see EovwaRs, MAINTAINING COMPMTi1IN 133-55 (1949).
148. Nationalization might in fact be the cheapest and most efficient method of han-
dling marginal "sick!' industry. Since even the Progressive Party has declared itself
against "socialism" and for "capitalism," however, this is probably politically impossible.
For examples of particularized industry control, see Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938, 52 STAT. 31, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. (1946); Atomic Energy Act of 1946,
60 STAT. 755, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1801 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1949) ; Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, 52 STAT. 977, 49 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1946) ; Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT.
379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1946).
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to the problem of monopoly.14 The compromise is necessary. Decentraliza-
tion of power cannot be achieved in all industries. Attempts to thrust com-
petition upon those industries in which decentralization is impossible leads
to hard case law and economically undesirable results. The British scheme
is based on three fundamentals necessary to successful antitrust adminis-
tration: (1) coordination in overall policy and among the various govern-
ment departments; (2) placement of responsibility for appropriate remedy in
the hands of personnel specifically authorized to effectuate, and precisely
instructed in, that policy; and (3) treatment of the problem of monopoly
as simply an economic problem which the government has a duty to resolve.
None of these principles necessitates a concurrent adoption of the British
attitude that monopoly is inevitable. Under a program based on them,
competition may have the opportunity to prove itself as a workable system
in many industries where it is now absent. The alternative to a forthright
stimulation of competition in areas where it is appropriate may be eventual
adoption of the British plan in toto.
149. The program outlined is not intended to constitute a complete coverage of the
field. Freedom of entry into the competitive arena, for example, could be stimulated by
appropriate revision of the patent laws, including compulsory licensing provisions, and
financial assistance to new enterprise through such government agencies as the RFC.
For detailed proposals, see generally E=ARWs, MuNTAMING CoUn'nrrnox (1949);
Siooes, A Posrrm PxoRAm¢ -oR LussEz FAmE (1934).
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